Unravelling LOBOs

8 July 2015/1 Comment
By Nick Dunbar

A few weeks ago, I was with Channel 4 Dispatches reporter Antony Barnett speaking to Sheffield Labour MP Clive Betts. We were on a park bench in some gardens next to the Houses of Parliament and we briefed Betts about our findings on Lender Option Borrower Option (LOBO) loans to UK councils – findings that were seen by a Channel 4 audience of over 1 million last Monday.

Betts is chairman of the Communities and Local Government select committee and we knew he would be interested in what we had to say. As we explained our calculations of upfront profits earned by banks and break costs to him, Betts interrupted us.

“These remind me of swaps sold to small businesses in my constituency”, he said. “Is there any way the loans can be unravelled?” he added later on.

What was it that we explained to Betts? And what do his comments imply? Let’s start with the explanation. The point is that LOBOs were a bad product for councils. Former trader Rob Carver, whom we interviewed for the programme, has a blog article refuting the arguments that council treasurers make. Rather than repeat those arguments, I want to highlight some simple economic realities that emerge from the data.

Although LOBOs are loans, they contain embedded derivatives, which in practice were hedged by banks at the date the loan was agreed. The contract terms can be entered into a derivatives pricing model to estimate the upfront trading profit that would have been earned by the bank. Effectively, this is the amount that the market would have been prepared to pay for a derivative with the same cash flows specified in the LOBO contract.

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